

Message Text

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USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE BE
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E.O.11652: GDS
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SUBJECT: MBFR: AHG BRIEFING OF THE NAC JULY 22
REF: MBFR VIENNA 0428 DTG 211432Z JUL 77

BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIZES THE JULY 22 AHG
BRIEFING OF THE COUNCIL, AT WHICH THERE WERE NO MAJOR
DEVELOPMENTS. END SUMMARY.

1. AD HOC GROUP REPRESENTATIVE DE VOS (NETHERLANDS),
ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADORS COX (CANADA) AND INHAN (TURKEY),
GAVE A REGULAR AHG ORAL REPORT TO THE NAC JULY 22 ALONG
THE LINES OF TEXT TRANSMITTED REFTEL. AT COMPLETION OF
REPORT, SYG LUNS OBSERVED THAT QUOTE NO GREAT BREAK-
THROUGH HAD BEEN ACHIEVED END QUOTE. HE ALSO NOTED
A REUTERS DISPATCH FROM VIENNA WHICH HAD REPORTED AN
INITIAL NEGATIVE EASTERN REACTION.

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2. UK REP (KILLICK) ASKED WHAT THE EAST HAD SAID AT
USUAL END-OF-ROUND PRESS CONFERENCE ABOUT THE WESTERN
PROPOSAL.

3. DE VOS REPLIED THAT IN ITS CONCLUDING PRESS STATEMENT
THE EAST HAD NOT DIRECTLY CRITICIZED THE RECENT WESTERN
PROPOSAL ON DATA EXCHANGE. HOWEVER, IN RESPONSE TO

QUESTIONS AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THE EASTERN SPOKESMAN COMPARED THE EASTERN AND WESTERN PROPOSALS, CRITICIZING THE LATTER ON GROUNDS THAT UNLIKE THE EASTERN PROPOSAL, IT WENT INTO THE QUESTION OF STRUCTURE AND LOCATION OF FORCES. DE VOS NOTED THAT IN HIS FINAL CONFERENCE HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THE PRESS THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL DID NOT ASK FOR THE LOCATION OF FORCES.

4. SCHUURMANS (BELGIUM) CLAIMED THAT THE AHG HAD CHANGED INTENT OF THE NAC GUIDANCE WHEN PRESENTING THE DATA EXCHANGE PROPOSAL. HE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO THE AHG'S LEAD IN TO PARA 1D OF THE GUIDANCE (C-M(77)53) RE DIVISIONAL DATA, I.E., QUOTE IN ADDITION, THE WEST IS PREPARED AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO EXCHANGE DATA...ETC. END QUOTE. SCHUURMANS SAID THAT WHATEVER THE TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS, THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT WAS OF THE CONVICTION THAT INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE NAC SHOULD BE FULLY ADHERED TO AND THE AHG SHOULD BE CONCERNED ONLY WITH TACTICAL AND NOT SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.

5. DE VOS SAID THE AHG WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL ISSUES INVOLVED. HOWEVER, THE GENERAL FEELING IN THE AHG HAD BEEN THAT TO PUT FORWARD TOO STRONGLY THE BREAKDOWN TO DIVISIONAL LEVEL WOULD DIMINISH THE CHANCES OF ACCEPTANCE FOR THE OVERALL PROPOSAL. THE AHG FELT THAT FOOTNOTE TWO IN THE GUIDANCE GAVE THEM DISCRETION TO USE THE FORMULATION
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THEY ACTUALLY PUT TO THE EAST. DE VOS SAID THAT EASTERN REACTION HAD CONFIRMED THE AHG FEELING; I.E., THAT A DIVISIONAL BREAKDOWN WOULD BE HARD FOR THE EAST TO ACCEPT.

6. SCHUURMANS RETURNED TO THIS POINT BRIEFLY, CALLING IT A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE, AND REMINDING THE AHG THAT THE COUNCIL CAN BE CONTACTED AND CONVENED ON VERY SHORT NOTICE. (COMMENT: THERE WERE NO ADDITIONAL COMMENTS OR EVIDENCE OF SUPPORT FROM THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE BELGIAN POSITION).

7. PAULS (FRG) NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT THE ALLIES WERE ABLE TO AGREE ON INSTRUCTIONS TO THE AHG CONCERNING DATA EXCHANGE. HE VIEWED THIS AS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD. HE THANKED THE ALLIES FOR THEIR COOPERATION AND THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE FRG'S CONCERNS. IT WAS CLEAR, HE CONTINUED, THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL MUST BE EXAMINED BY THE EAST. HE HOPED THE WARSAW PACT WOULD ACT CONSTRUCTIVELY AFTER THE RECESS, BUT SHOULD THEY CONTINUE TO INSIST ON A PURELY NATIONAL BREAKDOWN OF DATA, HE FELT IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE THE EAST WAS NOT

INTERESTED IN CLEARING UP THE DISCREPANCIES, BUT RATHER WAS AIMING AT ESTABLISHING NATIONAL FIGURES. PAULS SAID HE BELIEVED THE AHG SHOULD BE ALLOWED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER WESTERN PROPOSALS WERE ACCEPTED TO CALL INTO QUESTION THOSE EASTERN FIGURES IN CONFLICT WITH WESTERN DATA. HE DID HOWEVER ADMIT IT MIGHT BE PREMATURE TO DISCUSS THAT TOPIC AT COUNCIL MEETING.

8. DE VOS OBSERVED THAT THE MAIN EASTERN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE WESTERN PROPOSAL HAS BEEN THAT THE WEST WAS ASKING TOO MUCH OF THEM. THEY ARE WORRIED THAT A

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DATA DISCUSSION WOULD NOT STOP AT JUST ARMIES AND THAT IT WOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO SUPPLY DATA. HE FELT THE WEST MAY NEED TO GO SLOWLY AS IT HAS PRESENTED A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL WHICH WILL REQUIRE SOME TIME FOR DISCUSSION IN THE EAST.

9. DE VOS ALSO NOTED THAT THE EAST MAY FIND SOME ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT - FOR EXAMPLE, THE IDEA OF MULTI-LATERAL HEADQUARTERS. OUR PROPOSAL WOULD BE VIEWED AS ASKING THEM TO RECOGNIZE THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVITY, THE IDEA OF BLOCK-TO-BLOCK NEGOTIATIONS, OF NATO, ETC. MOREOVER, THEY MAY CONSIDER THE GROUND/AIR STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH IS TAILORED TO OUR OWN PROPOSALS. IN SUM, DE VOS ARGUED THAT THERE MAY BE SOME LEGITIMATE DIFFI-

CULTIES FOR THE EAST IN THE WESTERN PROPOSAL AND RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF INTEREST ON THEIR PART IN CLEARING UP DATA DISCREPANCIES.

10. COX AGREED WITH DE VOS' STATEMENT AND NOTED THE
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SOVIETS HAD ALREADY POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS NO GUARANTEE THE WEST WOULD NOT PRESS FOR MORE AND MORE DISAGGREGATION OF DATA.

11. CATALANO (ITALY) SPOKE BRIEFLY IN SUPPORT OF PAULS' STATEMENT AND ON THE NEED FOR THE AHG TO BE PREPARED TO PRESENT RED DATA AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME.

12. DE VOS SAID THAT THERE WAS NO UNANIMITY OF VIEW WITHIN THE AHG ON THE QUESTION OF TABLING RED DATA. AT PRESENT, THE WEST HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF BEING ABLE TO ATTACK EASTERN FIGURES. IF THE WEST TABLES ESTIMATES OF EASTERN DATA, THE EAST WILL THEN HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ATTACK OUR ESTIMATES AND THE AHG MAY HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY IN SUPPORTING SUCH FIGURES. BASICALLY, A MAJORITY IN THE AHG FEEL THAT THIS IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT TO TABLE RED DATA.

13. COX SAID THIS WAS A QUESTION OF TACTICS AND THAT BEFORE TAKING SUCH A STEP, THE WEST MUST BE SURE IT IS ON THE RIGHT TRACK. HE BELIEVED IT PREFERABLE TO REMAIN AS LONG AS POSSIBLE IN A POSITION OF OBLIGING THE EAST TO DEFEND THEIR ESTIMATES.

14. KILLICK SAID HE BELIEVED IT A MISTAKE TO READ TOO MUCH INTO THE INITIAL EASTERN REACTION AND HE FELT THE WEST WAS IN A VERY STRONG POSITION. IT WAS NOT THE WEST'S FAULT THAT THE EAST IS SECRETIVE AND THE WEST IS NOT ASKING MORE OF THEM THAN WE ARE ASKING OF OURSELVES.

15. SVART (DENMARK) SAID HE BELIEVED THE PUBLIC WOULD RECOGNIZE THE WESTERN PROPOSAL AS REASONABLE. WHILE IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF MULTI-LATERAL HEADQUARTERS, THE FIGURES INVOLVED WERE SO
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SMALL IN COMPARISON TO OTHER FORCE ELEMENTS THAT HE DID NOT SEE HOW IT COULD PREJUDICE THE WESTERN POSITION.

16. DE VOS OBSERVED ONCE AGAIN THAT THE EAST MAY HAVE

PROBLEMS OF PRINCIPLE. THEY ARE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE IDEA OF BALANCE AND THEY HAVE NO MULTI-LATERAL HEADQUARTERS IN THE NGA. WITH REGARD TO PUBLIC RELATIONS, THE WEST WAS WELL OFF WITH ITS NEW PROPOSAL.

17. HARDY (CANADA) ASKED WHETHER THE PROSPECTS FOR MBFR WOULD BE AFFECTED BY OUTSIDE DEVELOPMENTS, SUCH AS CSCE OR DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN NATO. HE WONDERED WHETHER THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD REFERRED AT ALL TO NATO DECISIONS ON LONG TERM DEFENSE PLANNING. THE SHORT TERM MEASURES OR THE EAST-WEST STUDY.

18. COX NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME REFERENCE TO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NATO. THESE WERE NOT EXPLICIT BUT HAD BEEN USED IN THE CONTEXT OF QUESTIONING OUR GOOD FAITH . IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. AS FOR CSCE, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT CSCE AFFECTING THE VIENNA DISCUSSIONS. SALT, ON THE OTHER HAND, SEEMS MORE RELEVANT TO THE MBFR DISCUSSIONS. IN GENERAL, THE SOVIETS HAVE USED THE ARGUMENT THAT THERE IS AN HISTORICALLY DEVELOPED EQUILIBRIUM, A BALANCE IN THE CURRENT STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP, WHICH THE WEST IS TRYING TO DESTROY.

19. HARTOGH (NETHERLANDS) SAID IT APPEARS THE EAST IS IN DOUBT AS TO WHAT THE WEST MEANT IN ITS ORIGINAL PROPOSAL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF A TANK ARMY BY A LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS. IF IT IS TRUE THAT THE AHG HAS NOT YET BEEN GIVEN A MANDATE TO EXPLAIN THE WESTERN POSITION, THEN THE WEST SHOULD CLARIFY ITS STAND (PARA 12 REFTEL).

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THE WEST SHOULD CLARIFY ITS STAND (PARA 12 REFTEL).

20. LUNS SAID THE SPC WILL CONSIDER THE ISSUE.

21. COX SAID THAT SINCE THE ENTIRE ISSUE OF LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS HAS BEEN A DIFFICULT ONE FOR THE SOVIETS, HE THOUGHT IT SIGNIFICANT THAT TARASOV HAD ONCE AGAIN PUT A DIRECT QUESTION TO THE WEST AS TO ITS INTENTIONS.

22. HARDY ASKED FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF WHERE THE AHG THOUGHT THE TALKS WOULD GO FROM HERE. LUNS SECONDED THIS QUESTION AND ASKED WHETHER DE VOS WAS BASICALLY OPTIMISTIC, AS HE, LUNS, WAS NOT TOO OPTIMISTIC HIMSELF AND FAILED TO SEE HOW THE TALKS WOULD DEVELOP.

23. DE VOS SAID THIS WAS A DIFFICULT QUESTION TO ANSWER. THE EASTERN REACTIONS WE GET ARE OF LIMITED SIGNIFICANCE. BOTH SIDES APPEAR TO BE WAITING FOR SOMETHING TO HAPPEN. RECENT PUBLICITY ABOUT DISCUSSIONS AT THE SCHMIDT-CARTER
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MEETING IN WASHINGTON MAY GIVE THE EAST AN INCENTIVE TO SIT BACK AND AWAIT NEW WESTERN INITIATIVES. DE VOS THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO CLARIFY WHAT NEW STEPS THE WEST MIGHT CONSIDER IN ORDER TO GET THE EAST TO MOVE.

24. LUNS ASKED WHETHER THE AHG SHARED HIS VIEW THAT THERE WAS AN IMPACT ON MBFR OF OTHER NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICULARLY SALT.

25. DE VOS ACKNOWLEDGED THE EAST ORIGINALLY HAD COME RELUCTANTLY TO VIENNA AS A RESULT OF THE LINKAGE ESTABLISHED BY THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION BETWEEN CSCE AND MBFR. BUT HE FELT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN A LEARNING PROCESS FOR THEM AND THAT THEY HAVE COME TO RECOGNIZE THAT THEY HAVE AN AUTHENTIC INTEREST IN AN AGREEMENT - ALBEIT ON THEIR TERMS AND AT A PRICE THEY HAVE NOT YET DETERMINED.

26. SVART COMMENTED THAT THE FACT THAT THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS HAVE GONE ON FOR SO LONG IS NOT SOMETHING WHICH WOULD NECESSARILY SOUR THEM IN THE SOVIET MIND. THEY ARE USED TO COMPLICATED, DRAWN-OUT DISCUSSIONS AND QUITE A FEW NEGOTIATIONS WITH THEM HAVE GONE ON LONGER.

27. PAULS SAID IN THE NEXT PHASE THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE WEST WAS GOING TO ACHIEVE A POSITIVE

RESULT IN THE DATA DISCUSSIONS OR NOT. HE NOTED SOME
REFERENCE TO RECENT WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING
NEW MBFR INITIATIVES. THESE WOULD NOT AFFECT THE
SUBSTANCE OR BASIC PRECEPTS GUIDING THE ALLIES; I.E.,
THE PRINCIPLES OF PARITY, COLLECTIVITY, ETC. THERE HAD
BEEN SOME DELIBERATIONS OF A TACTICAL NATURE ON WHAT
STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN AFTER A DATA DISCUSSION GIVEN ONE
OR ANOTHER OUTCOME. THESE WERE NOT YET DRAFTED PROPOSALS,
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AND HE ASSURED THE COUNCIL THERE WOULD BE TIME TO DISCUSS
THESE NEW THOUGHTS. HE BELIEVED THE DATA DISCUSSIONS
WOULD EXTEND THROUGH THE WINTER AND THE REPORTS OF NEW
INITIATIVES WERE A LITTLE OVER-DRAMATIZED.

28. KILLICK CONCLUDED THE COUNCIL DISCUSSION BY AGREEING
WITH SVART AS TO THE STAYING POWER OF THE SOVIETS IN
NEGOTIATIONS. HE THOUGHT THAT THE FORWARD MOVEMENT IN
MBFR MIGHT WELL BE CONTINGENT ON DEVELOPMENTS ELSEWHERE
AND THAT THE WEST MUST KEEP UP THE PRESSURE. PEREZ

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